Abstract In this paper we reanalyze Said's (2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. We conclude that except for the expression of the equilibrium bidding strategy, all the results for the first-price auction are exactly the same as the corresponding ones for the second-price auction established by Said (2011). This implies that the well-known "revenue equivalence theorem" holds true for Said's (2011) dynamic model setting.
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