Sequential First-Price Auction with Randomly Arriving Buyers
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Journal of Systems Science and Information  2018, Vol. 6 Issue (1): 29-34    DOI: 10.21078/JSSI-2018-029-06
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Sequential First-Price Auction with Randomly Arriving Buyers
Shulin LIU1, Xiaohu HAN2
1. University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China;
2. Hebei Academy of Governance, Shijiazhuang 050031, China
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Abstract In this paper we reanalyze Said's (2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. We conclude that except for the expression of the equilibrium bidding strategy, all the results for the first-price auction are exactly the same as the corresponding ones for the second-price auction established by Said (2011). This implies that the well-known "revenue equivalence theorem" holds true for Said's (2011) dynamic model setting.
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Shulin LIU
Xiaohu HAN
Key wordssequential first-price auction   sequential second-price auction   dynamic market   symmetric Markov equilibrium   the difference equation     
Received: 2016-10-10;
Fund: Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71171052)
Cite this article:   
Shulin LIU,Xiaohu HAN. Sequential First-Price Auction with Randomly Arriving Buyers[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Information, 2018, 6(1): 29-34.
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